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Articulations and Translations: Decentralizing 
Action in the Videogame 
Carlos Baum α & Cleci Maraschin σ 
Abstract- This study explores the relation between cognition 
and videogame Player Character. It uses the procedural 
rhetoric as its main approach, understanding the activity of 
playing through its inner processes. The relation player-
character-game often appears described in terms of 
representation and identification. We however suggest that 
some concepts by Bruno Latour – such as articulation and 
translation – describe this relationship more accurately. They 
allow for a decentralization of a supposed origin of action, be it 
from the subject, be it from the machine. A less dichotomic 
way to describe such relation is presented at last, allowing us 
to think the playing experience as capable of reconfiguring 
both game and player.   
Keywords: articulation, translation, actor-network theory, 
cognition, player character. 
I. Introduction 
he relationship between games, computers and 
cognition can be traced back to the first computer, 
the ENIAC, described in its own time as an 
electronic brain. Alan Turing, who in 1936 formalized the 
concept of algorithm through the Turing machine 
theoretical model, understood artificial intelligence as 
the ultimate goal of computer science.  Both him and his 
group of collaborators believed that if a computer was 
able to defeat a human being in a chess match that 
would be a very important step towards that goal. The 
appeal of the game was simple: even with very well 
defined rules and all possible game states traceable, 
and even if the computer could play a million matches 
per second, it would still need 10108 years to play all 
possible games. That being said, in order to beat an 
expert chess player the computer would have to be able 
to react and anticipate the player’s movements in an 
intelligent way. By 1947 Turing had already developed 
chess software for computers1
 
Author α σ: e-mails: baum.psico@gmail.com, 
cleci.maraschin@gmail.com 
   (DONOVAN, 2010).  
With the development in 1962 of the 
Programmed Data Processor-1(PDP-1) – a 120-
thousand dollar computer, the size of a car with a small 
monitor and a keyboard – in the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology (MIT) the development of the first 
electronic game was made  possible:  Spacewar!.  In  it,  
 
                                                             
1 Only in 1997 IBM’s Deepblue was able to beat Russian player 
Garry Kasparov in a game divided into six matches with two 
victories, three draws and one defeat. 
two gamers control spaceships around a star and try to 
destroy each other. Although it was known only in the 
academy, Spacewar! became so successful that the 
Digital Equipment Department started to include a copy 
in each PDP-1 sold, and use it as favorable argument to 
reflect PDP-1’s potential to reach all types of 
consumers. After a while Spacewar! unleashed a 
reaction that would ten years later lead to the first 
domestic game console: Magnovox Odyssey, and its 
commercially successful sports game Pong, a simulated 
table tennis game in which players control paddles 
simulating ping-pong rackets (Donovan, 2010; Newman, 
2004; Wolf & Perron, 2003). 
Until the beginning of the 80s the few 
publications that held videogames as object of study 
were aimed at fans and potential consumers. At the start 
of the 80s the first scientific publications came out, the 
majority of them aimed at designers and programmers. 
It’s worth highlighting two of them: Mind at Play: The 
Psychology of Videogames (Loftus & Loftus, 1983) and 
Mind and Media: The Effects of Television, Computers 
and Video Games (Greenfield, 1984). Both stand at the 
beginning of a tradition of psychological studies about 
videogames, using tests and labs as their core 
methodology. 
Historians (Newman, 2004; Wolf & Perron, 
2003) agree, however, that it was not until the end of the 
90s and beginning of the 2000s that game studies 
gained some recognition, and electronic games 
became the object of study of various fields of 
knowledge. Whereas the first studies compare 
electronic games to other medias, especially Cinema, 
game studies have been building an identity of their own 
by understanding the videogame as a media of unique 
traits that must be understood within the practices that 
are pertinent to it. The same way it is not expected that a 
Literature researcher will not read, it is not possible to 
research videogames without playing them (Squire, 
2005). 
Psychological or cognitive studies involving 
electronic games are not a novelty: works on motivation, 
memory and attention are among the oldest scientific 
publications about videogames. But the rise of game 
studies and their approach to videogames as 
interdisciplinary field where player and game design 
coexist is.  
At the beginning of the decade these studies 
turned their focus to the cognitive operations within the 
T 
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core of the videogame playing experience, such as 
problem solving abilities (Squire, 2006) in an individual 
or collective level (Steinkuehler, 2006); pattern-
recognition abilities (Koster, 2005) and hypothetico-
deductive reasoning (Gee, 2008). In this scenario, the 
videogames comes up as a field where these 
operations may be observed (Steinkuehler, 2008), or as 
metaphor to thought and abstraction (Gee, 2008). 
Two elements come to the foreground and 
become important to this article. The first consists of 
thinking about how few studies there are exploring the 
role of the character in the playing experience and its 
relation to cognition (Kafai et Al., 2010; Lankoski, 2011) 
– although the player character (PC) is considered one 
of the most emblematic elements of electronic games 
(Newman, 2004). The second element regards the way 
these studies describe the relation between cognition 
and game, generally in terms of representation, 
identification and reproduction. We nevertheless 
suggest that some of Bruno Latour’s concepts (2001, 
2005a, 2005b) such as translation and articulation 
describe this very relationship more accurately.  
II. Methodology 
With the goal of thinking the effectiveness of the 
concept of translation and the symmetry to comprehend 
the relations between cognition and videogame we 
explore the playing experience in matches of a game 
called Defense of the Ancient (DotA), a massive 
multiplayer online battle arena game. DotA is a 
customized scenario created from the real time strategy 
game Warcraft III (Blizzard Entertainment (Firm), 2002), 
in turn inspired by another game, Starcraft (Blizzard 
Entertainment (Firm), 1998), called Aeon of Strife". In 
DotA each team of maximum 5 players must destroy a 
heavily protected enemy structure, called “ancient”, that 
is located in an opposite side of the map. Players 
control characters called “heroes”, and are aided by 
allies controlled by artificial intelligence, called 
“creepers”. Throughout the matches players develop 
their characters and use “money” (gold) to purchase 
equipment.  
This article is written based in one of its writers’ 
field diary, describing 32 matches played in a period of 
four months, totaling approximately 80 hours of game 
time. We approach the game mainly though the concept 
of Procedural Rhetoric (Bogost, 2008), understanding 
videogames as systems able to create, through their 
rule set, models of processes that make space for the 
possibility of action. The rules simultaneously create 
what is and what is not possible within the game 
experience, the same time they give meaning to this 
experience. The images, symbols – the theme – such as 
gunshots, soldiers and swords describe only partially 
this game’s expressive capacity. Meaning is built from 
the manipulation of the symbols available to the player 
obeying the rules of the game. We find the meaning of a 
game by exploring the possibilities of that space while 
playing. So much that this approach privileges the rule 
set, and questions narrative and visual speech as they 
articulate and interact to this set of rules.  
We however come closer to the comprehension 
of Voorhees (2009), in the sense that it does not 
understand the processes of the game as fully 
comprised within the machine – in which case the 
player’s role would be to just shoot or execute. We 
understand the process in a broader sense, involving 
mechanical operations, software protocols as well as 
player action. We analyze games while highlighting the 
relation between player and other game elements, 
understanding that the game is not only the co-
authorship of designers, writers and programmers, but it 
is something that unfolds simultaneously to players’ 
actions.  
The gameplay derives from a basic set of rules 
implemented by a programmed code, but it remains rich 
and multiple because each player only realizes these 
rules in a virtual environment that seems to be open to 
nearly infinite permutations. The player does not look at 
the underlying code of the game, but to the audiovisual 
and tactic results derived from it instead.  
It did not take me long to realize there was little time 
between a creep wave and another, something like 
30 seconds, and therefore it was necessary to act 
fast, before they grew enough in number to destroy 
my tower (Field Diary, Feb. 2012). 
But this is not to say that the player read the 
algorithm that generates the creep waves, like 
“Enemy1.PositionX = PositionX+1”. What is possible to 
realize is a mediated state generated by the code’s 
performance (Nitsche, 2008). 
III. Acting in the videogame 
The most crucial aspect to any cognitive activity 
always is the last possible connection of the technical 
outline, its most exterior layer. Players do not assign 
meaning because they understand the logics of the 
programming, but because they understand the 
functioning of the virtual world generated by it. The code 
itself remains hidden, unless there is an unexpected 
behavior or mistake. That being said we cannot state 
that the game code defines the space or the experience 
of the game. The programming code and the gameplay 
are different realms of experience, and there is no 
reduction between them.   
Different from Cinema and its product, the film – 
which can be repeated and analyzed from a stability and 
linearity standpoint –, the electronic game only happens 
as the agency of both its programming code and the 
player. The game cannot be reduced to its static 
programming code, stored at a hard disk. Neither is this 
code the interaction layer between game and user. The 
Articulations and Translations: Decentralizing Action in the Videogame
© 2014   Global Journals Inc.  (US)
  
  
 
  14
Y
e
a
r
20
14
  
 
G
lo
ba
l 
Jo
ur
na
l 
of
 C
om
pu
te
r 
Sc
ie
nc
e 
an
d 
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
  
  
  
 V
ol
um
e 
X
IV
  
Is
su
e 
IV
  
V
er
sio
n 
I 
(
DDDD D DDD
)
G
  
game only exists while action, as a process; in the 
absence of action, what remains is a code stored in a 
magnetic disk (Galloway, 2006). 
But how to define a statute of action on digital 
games? At the same time a team of players act, the 
software is executed. Player and computer participate 
together of the match, step by step, in such a way that 
both are indispensable for the game to happen.  
The goal in this initial moment of the match is to 
kill enemy creeps, and mainly avoid getting killed by 
your opponent’s heroes. Every time a hero kills a creep 
or destroys an enemy structure they acquire experience 
points (xp). Accumulating xp allows players access to 
new abilities; and to gold, which allows them to 
purchase equipment – which in turn improve existing 
character abilities or traits. The long-term goal is to 
become more capable than your opponent, so that it 
can be killed (or almost killed, and has to run away). 
With a free lane of enemy heroes it is possible, 
temporarily, to kill a larger amount of enemy creeps, and 
to move your creep wave towards enemy field.  To win 
the game players must destroy their opponent’s 
“Ancient”. (Field Diary, Feb. 2012) 
The player takes control of heroes, and makes 
way for his horde to move forward.  Although it is 
possible to distinguish actions coming from the 
computer and from the player, such division is artificial. 
When a player teams up with creeps in order to destroy 
an enemy tower both cause damage to the same 
source, in a way that damage is inseparable. Machine 
and operator act together, in a cybernetic relationship to 
perform various game actions. They recurrently exist as 
a unique phenomenon. Even if they can be 
distinguished for the sake of analysis, they must be 
understood in a symmetric way, that is, with no 
privileges for either side.  
Each game action is only possible through an 
association of all agents involved. That includes the 
player, availabilities of the virtual environment, and 
images and texts made available by other players, so 
that the player is, in a way, capacitated, authorized by 
the other agents involved. Action, as one might think, is 
not an exclusively human property, but rather the 
property of a group of agents. As Latour (20001) 
exemplifies, the B-52 does not fly, the American Air 
Force flies. That happens because flying is the property 
of an association of entities that include airports, 
airplanes, ticket counters and launch pads. Each one of 
these entities exchange competences and add to new 
functions and possibilities. The subject is no longer “(…) 
the source from where action comes, but is in turn the 
mobile target of a big array of entities swarming in the 
subject’s direction.” (Latour, 2005b, P. 46) 
After spotting an enemy creep wave, attack is 
necessary; the destruction of the opponent wave allows 
for the allied wave to move forward. Once the allied 
wave advances towards an enemy hero then that hero 
must deal with the situation before attacking any other 
player character, which in turn allows for that player to 
attack first.  
So the player’s actions disturb the homeostatic 
state of the game. That happens because without such 
attack both creep waves would annihilate one another, 
always in the same place. The game state shift calls for 
a compensatory conduct of the player – no longer 
attacking creeps in order to attack enemy heroes –, and 
this compensatory conduct acts as a source of 
disturbance for the game and for the other user; this 
user acts as a source of disturbance for the game and 
other users, and so on indefinitely until the state 
necessary to the end of the game is reached.  
Some authors (Bogost, 2008; Galloway, 2006), 
while examining the relation electronic game-player, 
suggest that the gameplay should be understood as the 
player’s attempt to simulate the game’s algorithm, the 
set of rules that govern the simulation. Through a simple 
repetition of gamer input + game output = result, in a 
loop, the player would continuously come closer to the 
ideal action, until he reached the result predicted by the 
algorithm.  
We assume here that playing videogames is 
something a lot more complicated than that. The fact 
that a player might know that every thirty seconds a new 
creep wave comes up does not mean that the player 
knows or is able to recognize the formula that produces 
these creeps on screen. The notion that the player’s 
experience and the game’s programming directly 
overlap may be questioned once we consider the very 
own action of playing. The gameplay is not a mirror for 
the game’s set of rules, but rather a consequence of the 
game’s and the player’s dispositions.  
The concept of magic circle (Huizinga, 1971) – 
a space-time constituted by a set of specific rules that 
demand a certain disposition and conduct code from 
the player – is often brought up to describe a situation 
from the player’s “real world”. The idea of this circle, 
however, might mistakenly lead to the idea of a simple 
circular repetition. An alternative approach (Arsenault & 
Perron, 2009) would be to understand the game as a set 
of spiral circles, however not of action and reaction, but 
of pure reaction instead. The player reacts to the game 
state, which in turn reacts to the player’s action. These 
circles gradually expand the player – it is not the game 
itself that is expanding, because its algorithm and its 
data are stored in a hard drive; it is only the gameplay, 
the set of possibilities that expand – as well as the 
player’s actions and knowledge.   
When we understand the importance of player’s 
and game’s actions in a symmetric way we realize that 
this relation takes place in a level above the generating 
algorithm. This relation happens in the digital world 
generated by this algorithm, with its availabilities and 
limitations, but it cannot be reduced to it. Thus learning 
a new game does not mean to simply and adequately 
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internalize its code: it means to give body to the set of 
relations between possible actions and scenario 
possibilities thorough action (Gee, 2008). In order to 
maintain the principle of symmetry we must also 
describe how it is possible to think this relation from the 
machine’s side, in a way that is not strictly 
representational. Therefore we will examine the 
relationship player-avatar to demonstrate how the 
concept of articulation (Latour, 2001) describes it in a 
more precise way. 
IV. Goblin Technology  
A fairly recurring description (both in literature 
and common sense) is that the avatar represents the 
player in a virtual world. Kafai and col. (2012), for 
instance, describe the use of the avatar as an 
opportunity for youngsters to create various self 
representations, and reinterpret themselves to other 
players. Players are thinking centers, transmitting wills 
through their console or keyboard, and the avatar’s 
function is to mimic these wills, and to allow other 
physically distant players to understand them. Or even 
that the character’s image evokes a form of projective 
identification through which subjects fantasize about a 
body they would like to possess. On the other hand, a 
more detailed examination reveals that the function of 
the avatar is not exactly to represent the action of a 
player.  
DotA has 104 characters, divided into two factions: 
each character possesses four different abilities, 
and every time the character levels up it can 
enhance one of these abilities. The character also 
carries 6 items
 
that may be purchased throughout 
the game, of a total of 128, elevating the number of 
possible combinations to an astronomical level. 
After few unsuccessful matches, I go to an official 
DotA forum (www.playdota.com), in a specific 
section called “Guides”,
 
and as the title suggests, I 
find many guides written by other players providing 
guidelines for beginners like me. After some reading 
it seems to be a consensus that the character called 
Goblin Techies is accessible to beginners. 
 
(…)
 
Techies seems relatively easy; indeed, their attack 
hits distant enemies, and that seems safer than 
facing my opponents with swords and spears. I can 
also plant landmines that explode when an 
opponent is near; set stasis traps that stun the 
opponent; commit suicide, although I am not sure 
what is the use of that yet; and plant remotely 
controlled mine, that only activate when triggered by 
me (Field Diary, Mar., 2012).
 
When clicking a certain part of the screen with 
the left mouse button, the Goblins start to walk in that 
direction. A simple keyboard command (Ctrl+h) makes 
them plant a bomb. Clicking the right button directly 
over an enemy makes my character shoot a flaming 
catapult of sorts. While sitting in my room hitting the 
keyboard and clicking the mouse I personally did not 
walk, neither plant bombs nor shot a catapult. And still, 
we cannot say I did not participate in the movements or 
the shots taken by the avatar. Hence it is certain that my 
action did modify the state of the game as a whole, and 
it specifically moved my avatar.  
The change in the state of the avatar, however, 
also brings about new player actions. By crossing 
enemy creeps, I move my mouse to attack them; if my 
character’s energy is low, I click so that he moves away 
form the battle. Character and player mutually 
interchange properties. The pressing of a button makes 
the characters use magic that wins a combat allowing 
the player (or would it be the game?) to move on to the 
next phase. What is established between both is an 
articulation (Latour, 2001), a negotiation of possibilities, 
sharing the responsibility of action among all elements 
involved.  
Videogames make use of various ways to guide 
or limit the player’s choices of action, and therefore 
direct the relation established between player and 
avatar. Lankoski (2011) suggest three categories of 
techniques to guide the gameplay: 1) Character’s Goals, 
which limit the plausible actions in a game. If players 
wish to move forward, they must agree to their 
character’s motivations. When it comes to DotA, all 
characters have the same goal, which is to destroy the 
enemy Ancient.   
[2] Possible and impossible actions: What choices 
have been made available and what possibilities are 
left out; how reasonable are the choices—what is 
easy and what is hard? [3] Predefined functions of a 
PC: These are the procedures that are triggered by 
an event in a game or by the choices of the player 
(e.g., pre-designed dialogue, movement style, 
gestures, and facial expressions) (p. 300). 
Such restrictions not only stop or distort the 
player’s operation, but also direct it. The opposite, 
however, also occurs: the action of the player makes 
room for other elements of the game to present 
themselves. The avatar is a sort of heritance left by 
game designers, one that the player receives and must 
deal with. There is a big array of possible actions that 
vary according to each game. These actions and the 
game’s virtual world are built in a way to adjust to each 
other. The character, its abilities and available 
equipment are designed as to make it easier to reach 
goals in a certain way than another.  The environment is 
projected to interact with this character’s limitations and 
abilities with certain inclinations or availabilities. This 
availability is not present in that world alone, but it 
resides in the relation established between specific 
abilities of that character and the way objects from that 
world encourage or discourage certain possibilities of 
action (Gee, 2008). 
Articulations and Translations: Decentralizing Action in the Videogame
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It is easier to understand the relation between 
the character’s restrictions and the player’s actions if we 
exam the way vehicles in racing games, which obviously 
are not meant to resemble humans, are set apart from 
one another and how they are presented: in a general 
sense they do not have a pilot – the vehicles diverse in 
terms of acceleration, turning skills, top speed and so 
on. None of them excels in all departments. Maintaining 
a certain balance in the game is paramount, so much 
that all come close in terms of general capacity. A 
common organization is for cars (or aircrafts) with good 
acceleration not to have top speed, the same way cars 
with great maximum speed have poor acceleration. 
These functional differences are by no means trivial, and 
they significantly affect the way the game unfolds. For 
instance, narrow lanes filled with turns are significantly 
harder if the player chooses a car with poor turning 
skills. The same way a vehicle with good acceleration 
instead of top speed will benefit the player during races 
that take place in tracks filled with interconnected turns. 
In this case the ability to quickly regain speed after slow 
sections, instead of purely trusting in maximum speed – 
which in such tracks can never be achieved –, is 
beneficial.  
Action is displaced among the actors 
throughout the game. The player acts so that the 
character acts, once both possess active force to move 
the game forward. It is no longer necessary to look back 
the two traditional ontological sources of knowledge – 
subject and object. I find it more interesting to refer to 
propositions, in the terms suggested by Latour (2001; 
2004, 2005b). Propositions are not arguments, nor 
objects, not even a middle ground between them. They 
are, above all, performance. 
It is precisely what the word “pro-positions” 
suggests: they are not positions, things, substances 
or essences intrinsic to a nature constituted of mute 
objects in face of a talking human mind. But they 
are occasions to establish contact, made possible 
by various entities. These occasions allow entities to 
modify their definitions throughout an event (Latour, 
2001, P. 164).    
 Consequently, what distinguishes player and 
game is not one single ontological abyss, but 
innumerous big and small, reductive and non-reductive, 
temporary and definitive differences. Treating both as 
propositions makes possible for all entities involved to 
modify their definitions throughout an even, in this case, 
a match. The relation established between propositions 
is not of correspondence, but of articulation. The player 
articulates the character throughout the game, but the 
opposite also occurs. Articulation is not the privilege of a 
human mind surrounded by things of the world, but a 
property common to propositions, one in which different 
kinds of entities may take part.   
The level of sophistication in combining the 
chosen vehicle with the specific demands of each track 
is clearly reached only through iteration. Repetition 
teaches players the difficulties of a game, motivating 
them to reflect and be critical when it comes to 
considering their own style and ability. The “use” of 
avatars by players thus operates in this same model. 
Using Goblin many times, for example, teaches players 
the best places to plant bombs, which items are 
necessary in the beginning of the match and which 
become obsolete after some time, and which abilities 
should be developed first and their level of priority.  
Thought / action are therefore based in the 
articulation of many heterogeneous operations. Various 
non-biological mechanisms such as technologies take 
place in this process. Thought is no longer the attribute 
of a substance that is unique and transparent to itself. 
We must also leave behind the idea of a free and 
volunteer subject in the face of a world reduced to 
inertia and causal mechanisms on behalf of a network of 
actors that replace the radical oppositions of the 
traditional ontology with a nuanced, mixed world, where 
the effects of subjectivity emerge from local and 
transitory processes. Thinking is a collective state, 
where men and things mix (Levy, 2004).  
Differently from fictional characters, the 
“psychological motivations” of a videogame character 
are nearly insignificant when compared to their 
possibilities of action. There is a popular mistake of 
assuming players want main characters to have strong 
personalities, especially in adventure or action games. 
But if we look at the most popular examples of these 
genres we quickly realize that the character’s personality 
is often reduced to a minimum. Let’s examine Super 
Mario 64 (Nintendo of America Inc., 1998): although 
Mario has a very unique appearance, what really is his 
personality? He actually does not have any, making it 
blurred enough for players to imprint their own 
personality on him. What about Lara Croft, from Tomb 
Raider (Learning Company. et al., 1998)? Once again, 
distinct appearance, undefined personality. And if we 
take a look at the space soldier in Doom (Id Software; 
Activision, 2003) or Gordon Freeman in Half-Life (Valve, 
2007) we will not find any personality at all (Newman, 
2004). 
In the guide I used to pick the Goblins, the 
character description was as follows: 
Devilishly clever, the goblin techies, despite their 
small physical presence, are a force to be reckoned 
with. In line with their goblin brethren, the techies 
have the skill of laying mines in the earth, invisible to 
the naked eye. Also, after extensive training with the 
Orcish voodoo priests of Kalimdor, the Techies are 
adept at laying paralysis-inducing traps along with 
their potent explosives. Wary be the foe who takes 
these three lightly (XSTORM999, 2011).  
More than appearance or story, videogame 
characters are differentiated by their ability to affect the 
gameplay. They are plain, and might generally be 
Articulations and Translations: Decentralizing Action in the Videogame
© 2014   Global Journals Inc.  (US)
G
lo
ba
l 
Jo
ur
na
l 
of
 C
om
pu
te
r 
Sc
ie
nc
e 
an
d 
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
  
  
  
 V
ol
um
e 
X
IV
  
Is
su
e 
IV
  
V
er
sio
n 
I 
  
  
  
 
  17
Y
e
a
r
20
14
  
 
(
DDDD DDDD
)
G
  
defined in one sentence; they are generally described 
by players in terms of abilities they possess or action 
skills, as can be seen in the description above.  
The relation with the avatar is not exhausted in a 
specular relation – it is actually an inventive one, able to 
expand the experimentation range of players. Between 
them, a circulation of reciprocal effects takes place in a 
zone that produces differences, thus establishing 
articulation. This articulation is neither an individual nor a 
social field; neither does it belong to the subject nor to 
the game, but rather it is a cognitive agency “(...) made 
of connections, networks, temporary creation of 
interfaces belonging to both sides of the traditional 
ontological frontiers.” (Levy, 2004, p. 183). 
It is not unusual for youngsters playing with 
super-human heroes to replay a scene because they felt 
“they had failed their characters”. They wish to take part 
in a more spectacular scene, in resonance with one of a 
super-hero. Players feel responsible for the character 
(Gee, 2007). 
We indiscriminately mix our desires with things, 
the collective with narratives. From the moment we 
follow any hybrid closely, it sometimes seems like a 
thing, sometimes like a narrative, but it is never reduced 
to a simple entity (Latour, 2005b). 
Players are capable of understanding the 
character as a project with a predictable trajectory in 
time, which must correspond to expectations within its 
own limitations. Players plan the kind of “person” they 
want their characters to become, the history they will 
have, the situations they should or should not engage 
(Gee, 2007). This also comes from all that is learnt from 
the game, and how the game is supposed to unfold for 
that player. In order to operate an avatar it is paramount 
to find a way to adjust the abilities and the limitations of 
the character to the game’s availabilities in terms of 
space, in a way to adequately reach certain goals. But 
nevertheless the character retains a certain amount of 
malleability, and becomes a kind of vessel for the 
player’s intentions and goals. 
The character – with its abilities, goals and 
limitations – is a project the player inherits from 
designers, so in this sense it is an imposition. However, 
this very character is a vessel for players’ goals and 
intentions, so long as they take into consideration the 
inheritance received. In order for both goals to be 
achieved it is important that players bring their 
understanding closer to that of the designer, so that they 
can come up with their own goals – keeping in mind the 
goals proposed by the game (Gee, 2008). 
V.
 Final Considerations  
As discussed above, the role of the player 
character is not to represent the player, but to outline the 
set of possible actions within the world of the game –
 
such as opening doors, jumping or running. Treating 
this translation characters make of players’ actions as 
representation is a negative mediation, because it 
brings up the idea of unrestricted access to the virtual 
world. This notion holds the possibility of discarding all 
intermediary recourses such as keyboard commands or 
joysticks, whose function would thus be to distort the will 
of the player.  
The relation here is not the connection between 
two separate entities, but a movement distributed 
among a group of actors. The avatar is not the player’s 
middleman in the virtual world, whose function is to 
simply represent the player in that environment. If the 
avatar’s only function was to represent the action or the 
will of a player, limitations imposed by each kind of 
avatar should be considered a defect. A glitch in this 
representation of wills makes the avatar an unreliable 
middleman. But if we assume that the function of the 
avatar is mediation (LATOUR, 2005a, 2005b), it no 
longer represents the player’s action, but it translates 
the action. The avatar no longer transports the player’s 
will, he unfolds it, and by that constantly redefines player 
and game, distributing its supposed essence among 
the elements that comprise the action. Unexpected 
bifurcations unfold new universes of possibility at every 
action. Technologies are conceived to “as closely as 
possible relate to cognitive modules, sensorial-motors 
circuits, portions of human anatomy and other artifacts 
in multiple agencies of work” (Levy, 2004, p. 181). 
Player, avatar and the digital environment 
propagate activities in a transitory and open network, 
through articulations or bifurcations. Articulation is 
precisely this translation between two spaces or two 
different universes: from the analogical to digital, 
mechanical to human, hence building a heterogeneous 
collective through a deforming translation.  
What we propose is the existence of 
interpenetration between cognition and game, in a way 
we can no longer take them as pure, but as hybrids 
instead. Technology here is the element capable of 
reconfiguring human operations. The encounter 
between subject and videogame makes it possible to 
reconfigure cognitive functioning, in a kind of symbiosis 
that articulate goals, options and perspectives. From 
this encounter someone or something else is born, that 
is not constrained by any of those two agents; a third 
being, a hybrid. Cognition and game establish a 
complex relation, in which both are redesigned through 
operation.  
It is not about denying the diversity of reality. We 
do not claim that things are nothing but matter, and that 
for such reason brains can be connected to computers. 
We also do not claim that things think for themselves. 
We are not looking for a massive and indistinctive 
unification in order to claim that the game takes part in 
the player’s thinking. On the contrary, the notion of 
articulation forces us to recognize the heterogeneity of 
reality, produced at every step taken. If articulation takes 
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us to the notion of translation is because nothing follows 
the same way of functioning, the action must overcome 
discontinuities that transform it. Action itself is a moving 
discontinuity whose result is the promotion of other 
differences. What we suggest is “an ontology based on 
facts, purely relational, and therefore are neither material 
nor spiritual, neither objective nor subjective” (Levy, 
2004, p. 183). 
Instead of using the dichotomy subject-object 
as a starting point, or any of its variations such as 
individual-medium, nature-society, body-mind as 
dichotomies that allow knowledge or action to take 
place, we take them as the result of an action. Practice 
holds an ontological place in this panorama, specifically 
because it does not unite two distinct realities, but is 
responsible for the creation of two emerging poles, 
resulting from a network of processes, building itself 
reciprocally. Subject and object emerge, thought action, 
out of a field comprised of knowledge and things, of 
material, social, political, technological and linguistic 
elements. And each of these possesses a distinct 
operational structure.  
We should stop focusing on the rough, specular 
and easy opposition between flesh and blood men and 
the metal machine. We should instead focus on hybrid 
functionings made of men, words, networks and 
computers. The effectiveness of actions in the virtual 
world depend on this very interconnection, on the 
alliance between biological beings and an ever-growing 
number of artifacts and protocols, crossings of 
collective hybrids and complex and ever-changing 
circuits. 
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